The U.S.-Japanese Alliance Redefined: Implications for Security in the Taiwan Strait

Vincent Wei-Cheng Wang

Ithaca College

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.ithaca.edu/politics_faculty_pubs

Part of the International Relations Commons

Recommended Citation

https://digitalcommons.ithaca.edu/politics_faculty_pubs/29
The U.S.-Japanese Alliance Redefined: 
Implications for Security in the Taiwan Strait

By Vincent Wei-cheng Wang*

The U.S.-Japan alliance was the cornerstone for U.S. strategic posture in the Asia-Pacific and the region's peace and security during the Cold War. However, success bred complacency, as alliance became adrift. The end of the Cold War, heightened bilateral trade frictions, and new security challenges, such as a rising China, a nuclear-armed North Korea, and terrorism necessitated a reevaluation of this important relationship.

This article examines the redefined U.S.-Japan alliance and especially the implications of the 1997 Revised Guidelines for the U.S.-Japan Defense Cooperation and the 2005 “Two Plus Two” Talks for a military contingency in the Taiwan Strait. It will examine the special

* Dr. Vincent Wei-cheng Wang (王維正) is Associate Professor of Political Science and Coordinator of International Studies at the University of Richmond, in Virginia, U.S.A. He has published extensively in the areas of Taiwan's foreign policy and domestic politics, U.S.-China-Taiwan relations, East Asian politics and international relations, East Asian-Latin American comparative political economy, and science & technology issues in Scholarly journals and books. He is currently working on public opinion issues pertaining to national security and justice. Dr. Wang received his Ph.D. from the University of Chicago, M.A. from the Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins University, and B.A. from National Taiwan University. Dr. Vincent Wei-cheng Wang can be reached at <vwang@richmond.edu>
role that Okinawa plays in the U.S. security strategy in the region.

This paper sets out six main arguments:

(1) The Revised Guidelines for the U.S.-Japan Defense Cooperation were prompted by regional security challenges in the first half of the 1990s, such as the Korean Peninsula and the Taiwan Strait crisis, and provided a basis for Japan to play a greater security role in and beyond the region.

(2) The Guidelines established a policy of strategic ambiguity by proclaiming its applicability to “cooperation in situations in areas surrounding Japan” but refusing to specify whether the scope of the Guidelines includes or excludes Taiwan.

(3) In the event of a Taiwan Strait contingency, this implies that the U.S.-Japan alliance would serve as another option, in addition to U.S. arms sales to Taiwan and (increasingly) possible U.S. military intervention, as mandated by the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA).

(4) Operationally, before the U.S. completes a major realignment of its armed forces in the Asia-Pacific region, U.S. military action on behalf of Taiwan would draw heavily from its air and naval assets stationed in Okinawa.

(5) Enhanced U.S.-Japanese military cooperation over the Taiwan issue is accompanied by enhanced
coordination on “preventive diplomacy” to forestall moves by either Taiwan or China to change the status quo in the Taiwan Strait.

(6) In light of the changing regional and global security situation, the 2005 Joint Statement of the U.S.-Japan Security Consultative Committee (the “2+2 Talk”) affirms a series of “common strategic objectives,” and the first public enunciation that “the peaceful resolution of issues concerning the Taiwan Strait through dialogue” as a common strategic objective signals a coordinated approach to the Taiwan contingency.

(7) U.S.-Japan security alliance at this point seems distracted by such pressing matters as the war on terror and the Iraqi war. But its future viability depends on a reflection on such long-term and fundamental developments as China’s rise.

Keywords: U.S.-Japan alliance, Revised Guidelines of Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation, U.S.-Japan Security Consultative Committee, the “2+2 Talk,” Taiwan Strait, Okinawa, Taiwan Relations Act, China, areas surrounding Japan, East Asian security
INTRODUCTION: AN ALLIANCE THROUGH THE TEST OF TIME

Until the recent ascendancy of China in regional and world affairs in the post-Cold War era, it had been almost axiomatic for many to view the U.S.-Japan relations as the most important bilateral relationship in East Asia. The adage offered by the U.S. Ambassador to Japan Mike Mansfield in the 1970s – "The U.S.-Japanese relationship is the most important bilateral relationship in the world, bar none" – is widely considered received wisdom.

This important relationship was anchored on a strong but also unequal alliance forged in 1947. The alliance was structured as a grand "strategic bargain," under which the U.S. solved Japan's security problems by essentially providing extended deterrence over Japan, thus allowing Japan to forego military buildup and instead concentrate on economic development as the route to national salvation (this is known as the Yoshida Doctrine); it also served to mitigate the security dilemmas that would have surfaced within the region if Japan had been able to rearm.


Instead of the classical balance of power system or the NATO-style regional collective security organization, East Asian security during the Cold War was buttressed by a "hub-and-spoke" alliance system, under which the U.S. maintained a series of bilateral alliances, the most important of which undoubtedly was the U.S.-Japan alliance, and the forward deployment of U.S. troops. The bulk of U.S. troops in Japan were stationed in Okinawa.

For more than a half century, the U.S.-Japan alliance has served as the bedrock for peace and prosperity in East Asia. Japan was secured from threats to its security (possible Soviet attack), and the country has grown to become an economic giant. The public good provided by the U.S.-Japan alliance – peace and stability – provided a stable international environment which enabled many nations in the Asia-Pacific region to industrialize and become prosperous. Japan's prosperity thus depended on regional stability, and Japan's security contributed to regional prosperity.

However, although having "won" the Cold War, this bilateral relationship began to drift, and in some cases deteriorate, in the first half of the 1990s. A multitude of factors contributed to it: perception of


decreased regional security threats, increasing trade frictions, bureaucratic inattention, and public fatigue. It was not until the 1995 Nye Initiative that this trend was reversed. The report, written by a commission headed by Joseph Nye, Assistant Secretary of Defense of the First Clinton Administration and presently Dean of the Kennedy School at Harvard University, provided a critical intellectual and policy rationale for the continuance of the U.S. leadership role in the region and for a reenergized and redefined alliance.

Subsequent developments, such as the North Korean crisis, the 1996 Taiwan Strait Crisis, the rise of China, and the post-September 11 war on terror (Operation Enduring Freedom), gave further impetuses for redefining the U.S.-Japan alliance for the post-Cold War era. The alliance has proved capable of adjusting to the evolving regional and international security. However, the future of the alliance has also been a subject of recurrent debate.

This paper examines the rationales and substance of the redefined U.S.-Japan alliance. In particular, it focuses on the implications of the 1997 Revised Guidelines for the U.S.-Japan Defense Cooperation and the 2005 Joint Statement of the U.S.-Japan Security Consultative Committee (the “2+2 Talk”) for regional security issues, particularly a contingency in the Taiwan Strait. It will examine the special role that Okinawa plays in

---


the U.S. security strategy in the region. This paper’s main arguments are highlighted at the outset:

(8) The Revised Guidelines for the U.S.-Japan Defense Cooperation were prompted by regional security challenges in the first half of the 1990s, such as the Korean Peninsula and the Taiwan Strait crisis, and provided a basis for Japan to play a greater security role in and beyond the region.

(9) The Guidelines established a policy of strategic ambiguity by proclaiming its applicability to “cooperation in situations in areas surrounding Japan” but refusing to specify whether the scope of the Guidelines includes or excludes Taiwan.

(10) In the event of a Taiwan Strait contingency, this implies that the U.S.-Japan alliance would serve as another option, in addition to U.S. arms sales to Taiwan and (increasingly) possible U.S. military intervention, as mandated by the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA).

(11) Operationally, before the U.S. completes a major realignment of its armed forces in the Asia-Pacific region, U.S. military action on behalf of Taiwan would draw heavily from its air and naval assets stationed in Okinawa.

(12) Enhanced U.S.-Japanese military cooperation over the Taiwan issue is accompanied by enhanced coordination on “preventive diplomacy” to forestall moves by either Taiwan or China to change the status quo in the Taiwan Strait.

(13) U.S.-Japan security alliance at this point seems distracted by such pressing matters as the war on terror and the Iraqi
war. But its future viability depends on a reflection on such long-term and fundamental developments as China’s rise.

(14) In light of the changing regional and global security situation, the Joint Statement affirms a series of “common strategic objectives,” and the first public enunciation that “the peaceful resolution of issues concerning the Taiwan Strait through dialogue” as a common strategic objective signals a coordinated approach to the Taiwan contingency.

This paper first examines the evolution of U.S.-Japanese alliance during the Cold War. It then looks at the special role (and burden) played by Okinawa in this alliance. It then discusses the Revised Guidelines for Defense Cooperation and the Joint Statement of the Security Consultative Committee to underscore the geostrategic rationales for a revamped alliance for a post-Cold War Asia. It ends with discussions of the Guidelines’ and the Joint Statement’s implications for security in the Taiwan Strait.

U.S.-JAPANESE ALLIANCE DURING THE COLD WAR

During the Cold War, the U.S.-Japanese security relationship went through three distinct phases.¹² The first period began with the Imperial Japan’s surrender in 1945 and ended with the outbreak of the Korean War in 1950. During this period, the American occupation forces ruled Japan

and drafted a constitution that paved the way for a fundamental transformation of the Japanese state by achieving two main goals – the demilitarization and democratization of Japan.  

The most famous clause of the 1947 Constitution was Article 9: Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and order, the Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat of use of force as means of settling international disputes. In order to accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph, land, sea and air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained.

Under this provision, Japan possessed no armed forces. American military occupation both guaranteed Japan’s security and ensured that Japan would not rearm.

The second phase in U.S.-Japanese security relations during the Cold War lasted from 1950 to 1960. As American occupation forces were deployed to fight in Korea, they were replaced by the Japanese Police Reserve Force – a unit that evolved ultimately into the Self-Defense Force (SDF). American military occupation formally came to an end during this period. The two countries signed the San Francisco Peace Treaty in 1951 and a highly unequal Mutual Security Treaty in 1952. In the words

---

13 For a recent provocative account which argues that modern Japan, including what most of the U.S. criticizes in Japan’s behavior, stems directly from U.S. policy in the 1950s – a period when the U.S. occupation forces wielded enormous influence on Japanese public life, see Michael Schaller, Altered States: The United States and Japan Since the Occupation (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997).

of an analyst:

In addition to granting bases to Japan to the United States, it gave the U.S. a veto over any third country’s military presence in Japan, the right to project military power from bases in Japan, and an indefinite time period for the treaty. In addition, the U.S. insisted on the extraterritorial legal rights for its military and dependents.  

Japan remained an American military protectorate and Okinawa remained under American military occupation. The Korean War offered Japan opportunities to gain more political and economic independence. LaFeber thus concludes: “The Korean War was to the rebuilding of Japan as the Marshall Plan was for rebuilding Western Europe.”

The third phase was marked by the signing of a revised bilateral defense treaty in 1960. Although the new treaty triggered the largest demonstrations in Japanese history, both countries clearly benefited from the new defense arrangement. The U.S. successfully integrated Japan politically, economically, and strategically into its global campaign to contain the spread of communism. The “nuclear umbrellas” enabled Japan to hold its defense budget to roughly one percent of its GNP for almost three decades – a figure that led critics to argue that Japan enjoyed a “free ride” for its own security.

Unlike the old treaty, the 1960 treaty explicitly committed the U.S. to defend Japan, and to consult with the Japanese before putting forces into action under the pact’s provisions. The treaty had a ten-year


duration. Under Article 6, The U.S. retained basing privileges on Japanese soil, which proved critical as a staging ground and workshop for U.S. forces during the Vietnam War.

The most controversial aspect of the treaty was its application when "the security of the Far East is threatened." As a precursor to the controversy over the 1997 revised defense guidelines (to be discussed later), critics quickly challenged if "the Far East" phrase meant that Japanese would be obligated to help the American fight a war against China over Taiwan. In the Diet on 26 February 1960, Prime Minster Kishi Nobusuke gave in to U.S. views by defining the "Far East" provision as including "primarily the region north of the Philippines inclusive, as well as Japan and its surrounding area, including the Republic of Korea and the area under the control of the Republic of China [Taiwan]." Nevertheless, a diplomatic euphemism, "Far East," was used.

The formation of the SDF and the revision of the security treaty to include "the Far East" raised questions about whether Japan had gradually moved away from Article 9 – the so-called Peace Constitution. Many analysts make a key distinction: What the Japanese renounced in Article 9 of the 1947 Constitution was "the right of belligerency." However, Japan, being a member of the United Nations, clearly recognizes "the right of collective self-defense" authorized by Article 51 of the UN Charter and acknowledged in Article 5 of the 1951 San Francisco Treaty and the preamble of the 1960 revision of the security treaty. Therefore,


Japan, a nation that imports over 85% of its oil from the Middle East and whose export and investment interests span the globe, is legally permitted and prudentially justified to possess sufficient military capabilities for defending itself and its interests closer to home.

Throughout the Cold War, Japan barred its SDF from participating in operations outside of Japanese territory. This annoyed some American military planners. However, Japan played a valuable part by serving as a forward base of the U.S. military in Asia. The two allies frequently conducted joint exercises. In 1978 they signed an agreement -- the Guidelines for U.S.-Japan Defense Cooperation -- to establish procedures to follow in the event of a Soviet attack.\textsuperscript{19}

It should be pointed out that mainly as a result of its spectacular economic growth during the Cold War, Japan, by the 1980s, was paying for a substantial portion of the costs associated with the stationing of American troops in Japan. In addition, its defense budget, though capped at the symbolically important one percent, had grown steadily -- a trend that has accelerated in the post-Cold War era. Japan now boasts one of the world's largest defense budgets (see Tables 1 and 2). According to the figures provided by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), as of 2003, Japan's military expenditure was $42.5 billion (the fifth largest in the world). As comparison, the U.S.'s was $370.7 billion (the world's largest), and China's was estimated at $60.0 billion (second largest).\textsuperscript{20}


In fact, as Table 3 shows, the Japanese SDF is a force to be reckoned with. Many consider it the most technologically sophisticated non-nuclear force in the Asia-Pacific.

In sum, the U.S.-Japanese alliance during the Cold War had been pivotal for maintaining peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region, helping Japan transform into an economic giant, and promoting U.S. interests. However, this success was achieved with one notable drawback: the special role played by, or burden on, Okinawa – home of the bulk of American troops stationed in Japan and Japan's poorest prefecture.

OKINAWA: CHECKERED HISTORY AND UNEVEN BURDEN

Discussions on Okinawa's role in East Asian security and its future require a few preliminary words on its history and an understanding of the part it has played in U.S.-Japanese relations.

What commentators usually call "Okinawa" refers to the southernmost and poorest prefecture (ken) of Japan. The prefecture is composed of the Ryukyu Islands – an archipelago of 55 islands with a total land area of 870 square miles (2,254 square km) extending almost 400 miles (650 km) southwest from Kyushu, southern Japan, to the northern tip of Taiwan bordering the Philippine Sea (east) and the East China Sea (west). The prefecture has a population of close to 1.3 million inhabitants.21

Once an independent kingdom, the Ryukyus had historically been subjected to Japanese and Chinese cultural and political influence. It became a Japanese prefecture in 1879 during the early part of the Meiji era (1868-1912).\(^22\)

During World War II, the Okinawa Island (463 square miles or 1,199 square km), the largest in the Ryukyu Islands archipelago, was the site of one of the bloodiest campaigns in the Pacific theatre.\(^23\)

After the defeat of Japan in World War II, the United States military took control of the Ryukyu Islands. In 1951 a civil administration, headed by a chief executive appointed by the U.S. commissioner and based in Naha, the islands' capital and largest city, replaced the military government. The chief executive was elected by the legislature in 1966, and two years later his election was made popular.\(^24\)

In 1972 the United States returned Okinawa to Japanese control. However, the Japanese regained only administrative control of Okinawa. Under the deal struck during the 1969 summit meeting between President Richard Nixon and Japanese Prime Minister Sato Eisaku, as compensation, the United States received use of the bases, in the words of the eminent historian Walter LaFeber, "in language so loose that Nixon


\(^{23}\) In April 1945 U.S. troops made an amphibious landing in Okinawa, which was heavily defended by the Japanese. In the ensuing three-month-long campaign, U.S. forces sustained about 12,000 dead and 36,000 wounded before they were able to establish complete control of the island. The Japanese casualties were over 100,000 dead. The invasion of Okinawa was the largest amphibious operation mounted by the Americans in the Pacific war and resulted in the beginning of the end of the Japanese Empire. See "Okinawa" in note 2 and "World War II," Encyclopedia Britannica Online. &lt;http://search.eb.com/bol/topic?eu=118868&sctn=25&gt; [Accessed 23 March 2002].

\(^{24}\) "Ryukyu Islands," note 21.
retained the power to use them for launching nuclear attacks.”

Critics argue that since the end of World War II Okinawa has received a disproportionate share of the burden for maintaining U.S.-Japanese security relationship and implementing America’s military strategy in Asia. Constituting only 0.6% of Japan’s total land area, Okinawa houses 75% of the U.S. troops stationed in Japan on 39 bases – one of the largest concentration of U.S. forces anywhere in the world.

Okinawa is considered the “linchpin” of American military strategy in Asia and is a key nexus of the approximately 100,000 forward deployed U.S. troops in the Asia-Pacific region. Table 4 shows the distribution of the Pentagon’s latest data on active duty personnel deployed overseas.

(Table 4 about here)

Table 4 shows that among the 1.38 million total active military personnel, 18.6% are stationed outside the United States and its territories, whereas 81.4% are stationed on the U.S. and its territories. Among the American troops stationed overseas, 45.5% are in Europe and 39.3% are in East Asia and Pacific – clearly indicating these two regions’ strategic


27 Data in Table 4 were as of September 20, 2000. More recent data about troop deployments are no longer available from the Department of Defense’s website, perhaps due to significant movement of troops to fight in Afghanistan and Iraq and heightened concerns about the safety of American troops abroad.
importance to the U.S. (compared to Sub-Saharan Africa’s 0.1%).

The importance of Asia-Pacific for U.S. military planning purposes is clearly underscored in the Pentagon’s 2001 *Quadrennial Defense Review* (QDR) -- the Defense Department’s major high-level strategic planning document. The report says that with Europe largely at peace, “Asia is gradually emerging as a region susceptible to large-scale military competition.” It noted the possibility that “a military competitor with a formidable resource base will emerge in the region (the East Asian littoral).” Many suspect this implies China. The report echoed the conclusion of a February 2001 study by the Pentagon’s Office of Net Assessment (ONA) and its director Andrew Marshall, which “cast the Pacific as the most important region for military planners.” A subsequent study by the ONA reiterated that “long-term trends -- political, economic, and military – indicate that the primary security challenges the United States will face in the first decades of the 21st century will come from Asia.” In this context, the importance of the U.S.-Japan alliance only increases.

The most recent available data (as of 30 September 2000) shows that among the 101,447 stationed in East Asia and the Pacific, 40,159 (or 40%) are stationed in Japan, 36,565 (or 36%) are stationed in South Korea, and another 23,352 (or 23%) are “afloat” -- mainly naval personnel on ships.

---


This confirms the conventional wisdom on the importance of these two Asian allies to the U.S.

However, a further scrutiny of the country distribution by service reveals a case for troop rationalization in light of how war may be fought in the future, rather than was fought in the past: More than 95% of the U.S. marines in East Asia and the Pacific are in Japan (with a majority of them on Okinawa); however, a Normandy-type of amphibious invasion does not appear a likely strategy in future contingencies in the region. By contrast, 94% of the U.S. army personnel in the region are stationed in South Korea, evidently positioned as a “tripwire” to cope with a probable land-originated contingency (North Korea). In addition, 60% and 39% of the U.S. air force personnel are deployed in Japan and South Korea, respectively.31

These data corroborate the conventional view that the U.S. strategic posture in East Asia-Pacific is anchored on America’s bilateral security treaties with Japan and South Korea and bolstered by the more than 100,000 forward deployed troops in the theatre, with the lions’ shares going to Japan and South Korea.

However, U.S. troops in Japan, for the defense of Japan and maintaining regional security, are disproportionately concentrated on Okinawa.

Chalmers Johnson, the founder of Japan Policy Research Institute

31 All percentages are calculated from data in Table 1, see U.S. Department of Defense, _Defense Almanac_, “Active Duty Military personnel Strengths by Regional Area and by Country.” <http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/almanac/almanac/people/serve.html> [Accessed 2 March 2002].
and a former professor at University of California, Berkeley, is one of the most vocal critics of American-Japanese complicity toward Okinawa. He points out that the American bases in Okinawa together take up an estimated 20% of the prime agricultural land in the central and southern parts of the main island of Okinawa, while contributing, directly or indirectly, to only about 5% of the gross domestic product of the prefecture. Meanwhile, Japan's "host nation support," around $5 billion a year, is the most generous of all. It supplied 78% of the costs of U.S. troops on its soil.

Calling Okinawa "a cold war island," Johnson put it this way: "The Japanese government has so far been successful in making Okinawa, the most remote prefecture, serve as the 'garbage dump' of the [U.S.-Japanese] Security Treaty."

Nevertheless, most of the mainstream analysts favor the status quo and oppose the total withdrawal of U.S. troops from Okinawa, although some would accept a case for reduction or rationalization of troops. Ezra F. Vogel, a Japan scholar at Harvard and a former CIA national intelligence officer on Japan, predicts the continuation of the status quo by all involved. He argues that Japan will continue paying the support


35 Johnson, Blowback: 41.
for the housing of U.S. troops in Okinawa and elsewhere because the alternatives to a security pact with the U.S. – developing an independent military capacity to defend itself or engaging in unarmed neutrality – are less attractive. He is also confident that Okinawans will see the economic benefit by providing facilities to U.S. troops in exchange for economic aid from Tokyo. He also disputes the proposal for maintaining U.S.-Japanese treaty but pulling out U.S. troops – so-called “alliance without U.S. bases” or “a la carte” security relationship.  

“If the U.S. is to respond quickly to emergencies in places like the Korean peninsula it needs to have troops and supplies ready on hand,” argues Vogel. Not having troops in Japan would also undermine the credibility of America’s willingness to defend Japan.

During the Cold War, American bases in Okinawa provided a crucial staging platform for the projection of American power and rear area support. Even Johnson admits, “America’s two major wars against Asian communism – in Korea and Vietnam – could not have been fought without bases on Japanese territory.”

Indeed, the arrangement of U.S.-Japanese security relationship, which calls for the U.S. to station troops in Japan (to both protect and contain Japan) and for Japan, free from military burden, to concentrate on economic development, has proved to be satisfactory to all involved. Kurt Campbell, a former Pentagon official in the Clinton Administration and presently Senior Vice President of the Center of Strategic and

---


38 Johnson, Blowback: 39.
International Studies (CSIS), puts it this way:

The United States would take care of Japan's security, and Japan, in turn, would not ask any questions. The reality was and is that, for much of the U.S. national security apparatus, nothing could be more comfortable than an ally that provides bases, generous host-nation support, and does not want to be consulted. 39

However, Campbell laments that this alliance that "has provided the bedrock for U.S. policy in Asia and has been a mainstay, preserving peace and stability for nearly half a century," does not get the attention or recognition it deserves. 40 In fact, it had shifted into an "auto-pilot" mode or had become a "forgotten alliance." The end of the Cold War necessitated an update of this important relationship.

U.S.-JAPANESE SECURITY RELATIONSHIP IN THE POST-COLD WAR ERA

Although Japan had played a vital role in America's containment policy during the Cold War, the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War called into question the viability of the U.S.-Japan security pact. The first half of the 1990s saw the relationship deteriorate and adrift mainly as a result of decreased perception of regional security threat, increasing trade frictions, and bureaucratic inertia or inattention.


40 Campbell, "Energizing,": 125.
Japanese domestic support for U.S.-Japan security in general, and U.S. bases on Japan in particular, continued to decline.

Amidst these developments and the facts that the last time the guidelines were discussed was in 1978, much had changed since then, and that the U.S.-Japanese alliance was never really invoked during the Cold War, many in the U.S. and Japan stressed the importance of improving both the operative and the political credibility of the alliance.

For instance, Michael J. Green, a Japan analyst and presently the National Security Council’s Senior Director on Asian Affairs, argued in 1998, “As long as U.S. forward engagement remained credible, it is unlikely Japan would choose neutrality or appeasement if Beijing challenged U.S. hegemony.”

Mike M. Mochizuki, a Japan scholar at George Washington University, also asserted, “As long as China’s growing military power can be balanced by a robust U.S.-Japan alliance...in a Sino-American military confrontation over Taiwan...Japan has no choice but to support the U.S.”

Green’s and Mochizuki’s admonitions followed the basic premises of the 1995 document, United States Security Strategy for the East Asia-Pacific Region, authored by Joseph Nye (dubbed the Nye Initiative). The Nye Initiative arrested further erosion of bilateral security ties and reaffirmed the U.S. commitment to “maintain a stable

---


forward presence in the region at the existing level of about 100,000 troops, for the foreseeable future.\textsuperscript{44} The report described the U.S. presence as "oxygen." "Security is like oxygen: you don't tend to notice until you begin to lose it."\textsuperscript{45}

Symbolizing a paradigmatic shift, The Nye Initiative represented the increasing awareness of the need to update, refocus, and recommit the U.S.-Japanese alliance.

Two incidents in the early 1990s underscored the kinds of limitations of the alliance that the Nye Initiative sought to rectify. In the 1990-1 Persian Gulf War, even though it contributed billions of dollars to finance the war, Japan's strict interpretation of the 1947 Constitution prevented it from joining the allied coalition, which was deeply disappointing to those American critics who hoped that the Japanese SDF would play a more active peacekeeping role. In the showdown with North Korea over its nuclear program in 1994, Pentagon officials were thus unsure about the level of support they could secure from Tokyo.

Then in 1995-6, the Chinese People's Liberation Army (PLA) conducted a series of war games and missile tests aftermath of Taiwan President Lee Teng-hui's visit to his American alma mater, Cornell University. The Chinese saber-rattling culminated in March 1996, when Taiwan held its first democratic presidential election. The crisis was defused when the Clinton Administration dispatched the aircraft carrier battle group, USS Independence, from Okinawa to waters off Taiwan, to be joined by another carrier battle group from the Mediterranean.

\textsuperscript{44} For more details on the Nye Initiative, see two good sources: Yoichi Funabashi, \textit{Alliance Adrift} (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1999), chapter 12, and David Asher, "A U.S.-Japan Alliance for the 21\textsuperscript{st} Century," \textit{Orbis} (summer 1997): 343-374.

\textsuperscript{45} \textit{United States Security Strategy}: 1.
The Taiwan Strait Crisis gave American and Japanese leaders the clarion call to strengthen bilateral security ties. U.S. President Bill Clinton and Japanese Prime Minister Hashimoto Ryutaro met on 17 April 1996 in Tokyo -- shortly after the Taiwan elections. They issued a Joint U.S.-Japan Declaration on Security, in which they agreed to revise the 1978 framework for defense cooperation.

The new defense guideline, The Guidelines for U.S.-Japan Defense Cooperation, issued on 23 September 1997, was hailed by Kurt Campbell as “the Asian corollary of NATO expansion.”

THE REVISED GUIDELINES FOR U.S.-JAPAN DEFENSE COOPERATION

The drafting of the Guidelines was a careful balancing act. Ichiro Fujisaki, the Political Minister of the Japanese Embassy explained the three major principles used in the drafting. To assuage possible concerns of other countries in the region (like China) and a skeptical domestic public that the Guidelines were strictly within the Constitution and are not targeted at any third country, the Guidelines followed three basic principles:

- The rights and obligations under the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty and its related arrangements, as well as the fundamental framework of the U.S.-Japan alliance, will remain unchanged.

- Japan will conduct its actions within the limitation of its Constitution and in accordance with such basic positions as the

46 Campbell, “Energizing.”
maintenance of its exclusively defense-oriented policy and its three non-nuclear principles.

- All actions taken by the U.S. and Japan will be consistent with basic principles of international law, including the peaceful settlement of disputes and sovereign equality, and relevant international agreements such as the Charter of the United Nations.\textsuperscript{48}

In addition, there was a fourth clause in the section that also seemed aimed at allaying concerns:

The Guidelines and programs under the Guidelines will not obligate either Government to take legislative, budgetary, or administrative measures. However, since the objective of the Guidelines and programs under the Guidelines is to establish an effective framework for bilateral cooperation, the two Governments are expected to reflect in appropriate way the results of these efforts, based on their own judgments, in their specific policies and measures. All actions taken by Japan will be consistent with its laws and regulations then in effect.\textsuperscript{49}

Sections III, IV, and V of the Guidelines discussed how the U.S. and Japan would cooperate under three different scenarios: (1) under normal circumstances, (2) actions in response to an armed attack against Japan, and (3) cooperation in situations in areas surrounding Japan that will have an important influence on Japan’s peace and

\textsuperscript{48} These three principles form the first three clauses of Part II of the Guidelines: Basic Premises and Principles, see Green and Mochizuki: 57 and Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “The Guidelines.”

\textsuperscript{49} Ibid.
security (situations in areas surrounding Japan). Under the new Guidelines, the scope of Japanese SDF’s role in dealing with regional hostilities was greatly expanded:

- Japanese naval vessels may participate in blockades against other nations in support of internationally recognized sanctions.
- They can engage in minesweeping, surveillance, and search and rescue activities in Japanese or international waters.
- Japan will allow U.S. forces to use civilian harbors and bases during a crisis.
- Japan will supply food and fuel to American naval vessels during a crisis.
- The two countries will increase the sharing of intelligence and coordination of response if hostilities in the region appear imminent.
- Japan will help evacuate civilians trapped in unstable countries

Arguably the most significant and controversial aspect of the new defense pact is its provision for joint military cooperation on “situations in areas surrounding Japan.” Michael Green argued, “The 1997 Guidelines filled in the gaps from the third part of the 1978 Guidelines.” 50 According to this view, the 1997 Guidelines apply to “situations in areas surrounding Japan” because such contingencies will have an important influence on Japan’s peace and security. The Guidelines takes pain to explain that the concept, situations in areas surrounding Japan, is not

50 Green and Mochizuki: 75.
geographical but situational. It also requires that that “the two
Governments will make every effort, including diplomatic efforts, to
prevent such situations from occurring.”

In other words, the Guidelines calls for both enhanced mutual
coopera- tion on regional security challenges and coordination on
preventive diplomacy – that is, it calls for a stronger alliance during
peacetime and war.

The phrase, “areas surrounding Japan,” appears another masterful
diplomatic euphemism. At a practical level, most analysts agree that it
includes the Korean Peninsula. After all, it was the 1994 Korean nuclear
crisis that provided an impetus for the revision of the Guidelines.
However, the phrase might also apply to other areas – including the
Taiwan Strait. Green thinks that the artful handling of this delicate
issue – neither to explicitly include nor to explicitly exclude Taiwan from
the defense perimeter – is just right:

Taiwan could not have been excluded, because the
implication would be that the U.S. and Japan do not care
what happens in the area around Taiwan, which is not true.
On the other hand, if Taiwan had been included explicitly,
China would be provoked unnecessarily, and Taiwan would
be stimulated unnecessarily.51

This policy of “strategic ambiguity” seeks to preserve maximum
policy flexibility and exert dual deterrence – defeating China’s military
attack against Taiwan and dissuading Taiwan’s declaration of de jure
independence. Prime Minister Hashimoto never stated Taiwan would be

51 Green and Mochizuki: 75.
included or excluded from the scope of the guidelines. However, tired of the PRC’s incessant probing and lack of appreciation for Japan’s self-restraint, Seiroku Kajiyama, Chief Cabinet Secretary, said that the new guidelines would “naturally cover” a military conflict in the Taiwan Strait.52

The Japanese restraint shown in its penchant for diplomatic euphemism reflected its ambivalence about assuming a greater regional or global security role and its desire to avoid angering China. However, thanks to a series of developments in the past decade, Japan jettisoned its reticence and began to be more willing to support the U.S. The most dramatic turnaround is exemplified by the February 2005 “2+2 talks” between the two countries’ foreign and defense ministers.

JOINT STATEMENT OF THE SECURITY CONSULTATIVE COMMITTEE

On 19 February 2005, U.S. Secretary of State Condolezza Rice and Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld met with their Japanese counterparts and issued a landmark joint statement.53 After assessing the security situation facing the U.S. and Japan and reviewing the alliance, the statement declared a number of “common strategic objectives” in the region and globally. It affirms the importance of maintaining the capability to address contingencies affecting the U.S. and Japan. It supports the peaceful resolution of issues related to North Korea and encourages “the peaceful resolution of issues concerning the Taiwan Strait through dialogue.” While it welcomes China to play a responsible and


53 The text can be found at the State Department’s website http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ps/2ps/2005/42490.htm [accessed 19 February 2005].
constructive role regionally and globally, it also calls on China to “improve transparency in its military affairs.”

This marks the first time that the U.S. and Japan explicitly identifies Taiwan as a mutual security concern. In the past, the two had relied on euphemisms like “Far East” and “areas surrounding Japan” partly to defer to China. Analysts thus called the move a demonstration of Japan’s willingness to confront the rapidly growing might of China.54

Thanks to its rapid economic growth (averaging 9.5% per year in the 1990s), China has had double-digit increases in its military spending year after year since the early 1990s. The CIA currently estimates that China has the second highest military spending in the world – only after the U.S. China’s economic strength has enabled China to rapidly modernize its military and dramatically expand its influence in Asia. Under the new good-neighbor policy of “peaceful rise,” China signed an agreement with Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) in 2002 to establish a full free trade agreement (FTA) between them by 2010-15, while offering the poorer ASEAN nations “early harvest” in China’s domestic market.55 China’s trade offensive had outsmarted Japan in the region which has traditionally been beholden to its aid and investment. Last year, China surpassed the U.S. as Japan’s largest trading partner. Chinese drilling


last fall in an area claimed by Japan and a Chinese submarine caught in November trying to slip through Japanese territorial waters added to Japan’s sense of vulnerability.  

In addition, an increasing number of Japanese feel a sense of “donor fatigue” – despite billions of dollars in aid to China each year, Beijing continues to harp on Japan’s “insincere apology” and criticize the Japanese Prime Minister’s annual visit to the Yasukuni Shrine. Many Japanese are increasingly receptive to the idea of Japan becoming a more “normal country” – free from historical guilt and capable of playing a larger role on regional and global affairs. All these factors combine to cause Japan adopt a more assertive stance. Furthermore, peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait has always been and will continue to be crucial to the peace and stability of Japan. Last but not the least, the North Korean nuclear crisis triggered by the erratic Kim Jong II could have a fallout on Japan. For these reasons the U.S. and Japan find their strategic outlooks compatible amidst changing regional and global security challenges. The joint statement represent the latest and significant update of the alliance.

However, how will these lofty declarations translate into operational details in the Taiwan Strait contingency? To understand how this seemingly ambiguous statement may actually provide a legal and operational pretext for some future hypothetical military contingencies involving China and Taiwan, one can benefit from insights from the

In a comprehensive and updated testimony on the U.S. policy toward Taiwan given on the occasion of commemorating the 25th anniversary of the TRA, Assistant Secretary of State James A. Kelly asked Taiwan to seriously treat the threat posed by China’s military modernization and declared that “The United States is committed to make available defensive arms and defensive services to Taiwan in order to help Taiwan meet its self-defense needs” in accordance with the TRA.58

Ever since the abrogation of the 1954 U.S.-Taiwan mutual defense treaty in 1980, as a condition for normalizing relations between the U.S. and the People’s Republic of China (PRC), the U.S. has relied on the implied commitment reflected in the following language of the TRA to maintain peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait.

Section 2 of the TRA states that it is the policy of the United States


• to declare that peace and stability in the area are in the political, security, and economic interest of the United States, and are matters of international concern;

• to make clear that the U.S. decision to establish diplomatic relations with the PRC rests upon the expectation that the future of Taiwan will be determined by peaceful means;

• to consider any effort to determine the future of Taiwan by other than peaceful means, including by boycotts or embargoes, a threat to the peace and security of the Western Pacific and of grave concern to the United States;

• to provide Taiwan with arms of a defensive character;

• to maintain the capacity of the United States to resist any resort to force or other forms of coercion that would jeopardize the security, or the social or economic system, of the people of Taiwan.

Some analysts argue that despite the strong language about Taiwan’s security contained in the TRA, the U.S. is not obligated to come to Taiwan’s defense, and the TRA provides the U.S. only with an option to defend Taiwan. But an alternative interpretation would argue that the preceding section requires that the U.S. maintain the military capability to respond to attacks on Taiwan. It is in this regard the Revised Guidelines can be regarded as requiring a military capability for achieving this goal. In other words, TRA and Guidelines are complementary options.

Arguments for “strategic ambiguity” are increasingly being

challenged by the following developments:

• Increasing concerns that China may become a strategic competitor or rival to U.S. security interests and goals. These concerns are revealed by candidate George Bush’s talk of China as a “strategic competitor” and the various Department of Defense reports (such as QDR and annual reports to Congress).\(^{60}\)

• China’s military modernization and double-digit military budget hike, combined with its steady increase of deployment of SRBMs or MRBMs opposite Taiwan, have made the deterrence function of a strategic ambiguity policy increasingly problematic; consequently, only movements toward strategic clarity can deter escalated military threats. President Bush’s talk in April 2001 that he will do “whatever it takes to help Taiwan defend itself” reflects greater clarity.

• The revised U.S.-Japanese security cooperation guidelines provide one additional operational option for the U.S. to maintain peace, deter aggression, and to, when deterrence fails, defeat aggression. Hitherto the options for Taiwan’s security under TRA are either U.S. sales of defensive

---

weapons and training to enable Taiwan defend itself or direct U.S. unilateral intervention (as the 1996 aircraft carrier mission demonstrated).

The new Guidelines and Joint Statement not only enlist an important ally (Japan) when needs arise, but also fill in the gaps on how the U.S. would intervene in a Taiwan Strait crisis once it decides to intervene, as the next section shows.

A GLIMPSE INTO THE FUTURE? THE TAIWAN STRAIT CONTINGENCY

An increasing number of officials and analysts believe that the U.S. will most likely be involved in a Taiwan Strait contingency. Military planners in the Pentagon seriously prepare for this scenario. However, largely due to political sensitivities, a Taiwan scenario could present the U.S. armed forces with a host of relatively unexamined issues that, in the opinion of a forward-looking study, "would have to be resolved quickly to facilitate a sufficiently rapid response." 61

Few analysts believe that China seeks to, or can, seize Taiwan in a Normandy-style invasion. Rather, Beijing's aggressive military modernization in the last decade appears driven by a determination to prepare a military option to force unification — on Beijing's terms. Stunned by the narrow victory of incumbent Chen Shui-bian of the

Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) in Taiwan’s 2004 presidential elections, Beijing seems increasingly pessimistic about achieving unification through peaceful means.

The Pentagon report to Congress points out, “Beijing’s primary political objective in any Taiwan-related crisis...likely would be to compel Taiwan authorities to enter negotiations on Beijing’s terms and to undertake operations with enough rapidity to preclude third-party intervention.”\(^{62}\)

The Pentagon says that the PLA is developing strategies and tactics to use “surprise, deception, and shock” in any opening military campaign, while “exploring coercive strategies” designed to bring Taiwan into terms quickly.\(^{63}\) The goals are to disrupt Taiwan’s command and control system, create confusion, demoralize Taiwan society, and deny third-party intervention. Inspired by the “revolution in military affairs” (RMA) exhibited by the U.S. troops in the Persian Gulf War and the Balkan War, the PLA has assiduously developed information warfare (IW) strategies and capabilities.\(^{64}\)

The RAND report lists other scenarios, such as provocative exercises and air activities, small-scale missile attacks on Taiwan, large-scale missile attacks designed to harm Taiwan’s economy, degrade its


\(^{63}\) Department of State, “China is Considering a Coercive Strategy on Taiwan, DOD Says,” e-mail update sent by Office of International Information Programs, U.S. Department of State <uschinapd@yahoo.com> to <us-china@list.state.gov> (16 July 2002).

\(^{64}\) For more details, see Vincent Wei-cheng Wang, “China’s Information Warfare Discourse: Implications for Asymmetric Conflict in the Taiwan Strait,” Issues and Studies, vol. 39, no. 2 (June 2003): 107-43.
self-defense capabilities, and demoralize its population, naval quarantine (mining and submarine attacks), seizing of an offshore island, and missile and air attacks against Taiwan designed to destroy Taiwanese military capabilities.

While none of these options would be sufficient to compel Taiwan to surrender, the report argues that U.S. military assistance must be available promptly to counteract the shock of Chinese actions before Taiwan’s will to resist begin to fade. This would call for the U.S. to maintain a sufficient and credible deterrent force in the region.

Therefore, basing for U.S. air force is a crucial issue. As Figure 1 shows, a 500-nm-radius drawing from the center of the Taiwan Strait encompasses vast areas of ocean but very little land (outside of mainland China). In the near term, there would appear to be only two options: basing on Taiwan itself, which is politically impossible, or basing in Japan. That would leave the air bases on Okinawa the most logical option.

(Figure 1 about here)

It should be recalled that the EP-3 naval plane that collided with a Chinese fighter jet in April 2001 flew out of the Kadena Air Force Base in Okinawa on a mission to collect intelligence regarding Chinese missile deployment opposite Taiwan. The EP-3 mission was a response to China’s determined missile buildup, which complicated cross-strait reconciliation, despite America’s repeated warning. The asset for the mission originated in Okinawa. This is a textbook example of how Okinawa, under the new Defense Guidelines, may play an increasingly

---

65 Khalizad, The United States and Asia: 66-67.
important role in U.S. military strategy in East Asia-Pacific. The aircraft carrier that Clinton sent to cool off tensions in the Taiwan Strait was based in Yokosuka on the Honshu Island of Japan.

The aircraft carrier and spy plane missions are only the most prominent examples offering a glimpse into the future of Okinawa’s and U.S.-Japanese security alliance’s roles in regional security. There are other numerous daily mundane and uneventful missions involving American troops in Okinawa, such as scheduled ship patrols and logistic supplies. After all, Okinawa are a short distance away from Taiwan and Japan has an enormous stake in the Taiwan Strait – the channel through which most of its oil imported from the Middle East passes through and the market of two of its important trade partners.

Kadena is an important transit point for airlift in the Western Pacific. The base currently hosts two fighter squadrons, two rescue squadrons, one air refueling squadron, one reconnaissance squadron, one airborne air control squadron, and a number of support squadrons.\footnote{Information from Kadena Air Base public website, \url{http://www-02.kadena.af.mil/units_list.asp#18th%20Wing%20Organizations} [accessed 13 May 2004].} In other words, Kadena is usually a busy place, and it is not clear how many more aircraft could be operated out of the base under combat conditions.

In the longer term, the RAND report recommends exploring a base in northern Luzon, the Philippines (450 nm away) and considering basing options on the southern-most islands of the Ryukyu Island Chain – hence closest to Taiwan. Figure 2 shows the locations of a number of existing airfields in these islands and the associated table shows some of their more salient characteristics. For example, Shimojishima is less than 250
nm from Taipei and has a commercial airport with a 10,000-foot runway; the island also features a sizeable port that serves as a base for Japanese patrol boats. Basing in the southern Ryukyus would clearly be advantageous for the defense of Taiwan and alleviate some of the burden shouldered by central Ryukyus. However, this could involve considerable investment.

(Figure 2 about here)

As part of its troop reorganization plans in light of East Asia’s changing security imperatives and in anticipation of withdrawal or reduction of troops in South Korea and Okinawa, the U.S. recently has upgraded the role that Guam, a U.S. territory, will play in regional contingencies. By adding bombers, submarines, and other assets to Guam, the U.S. seeks to not only offset the loss of forward bases but also cope with the changing needs of new security challenges in the region. However, as Figure 3 shows, Guam is too far for rapid response to a contingency in the Taiwan Strait and is outside the range of most fighters without air refueling. It can, however, sustain a high tempo operation.

(Figure 3 about here)

REDEFINED ALLIANCE MORE IMPORTANT THAN EVER

Although East Asia has enjoyed five decades of cur at a moment’s notice on the Korean Peninsula and in the Taiwan Strait. In this

68 Khalizad: 73.
69 For a recent book dealing with Asia’s three most notable “flashpoints,” see Uk Heo and Shale A. Horowitz, Conflict in Asia: Korea, China-Taiwan, and India-Pakistan (New York: Praeger, 2003).
promising but also potentially dangerous setting, the U.S.-Japanese bilateral relationship is arguably more important than ever. The so-called Armitage-Nye Report of 2000 called for a thorough reexamination of the U.S.-Japan relationship in the context of the uncertain post-Cold War regional environment. The report adopts the view that with the world’s second-largest economy and a well-equipped and competent military, and as a democratic ally, Japan “remains the keystone of the U.S. involvement in Asia. The U.S.-Japan alliance is central to America’s global strategy.”

Indeed, Japan, under the leadership of Prime Minister Koizumi Junichiro, has played a larger security role. Japan has cooperated with the U.S. on dealing with the North Korean challenge, development of missile defense, the war on terror and Iraq, etc. All these endeavors are wider than what had been strictly prescribed previously and reflect Japan’s reevaluation of a changing security environment.

For the most part, the revitalized U.S.-Japanese alliance contributes positively to regional stability and security. This alliance has not become obsolescent due to the end of the Cold War and the dissipation of the Soviet threat. In fact, it has been redefined and rejuvenated. This new relationship enhances not only the operational credibility for U.S. actions with respect to unspecified threats in the region, but also the political credibility for a relationship that is anchored on democratic systems and two of the world’s largest economies. This is especially


71 Armitage et al., “The United States and Japan”; 1.
important as long as China’s long-term strategic vision remains uncertain.

The detractors will undoubtedly see the new pact in negative light. North Korea will see the pact mainly targeting it. China’s oppositions to the U.S.-Japan defense pact can be grouped together in four points: (1) Alliance presumes a common enemy, and with the Soviet Union gone, that assumed but unmentioned enemy is China. (2) The real purposes for the alliance are, just like America’s strengthening of security relationship with other allies, to contain China and perpetuate American hegemony. (3) With America’s tacit support, Japan is ready to rearm itself. (4) By including Taiwan under the “surrounding area” and declaring Taiwan to be their “common security concern,” the U.S. and Japan have interfered in Chinese internal affairs and have unwisely encouraged Taiwan independence hardliners.72

China’s oppositions are likely to be measured for a number of reasons: (1) Both Japan and the U.S. have reassured that the pact is not targeted at any third country. (2) The guidelines are revised within the context of the Peace Constitution. (3) The peaceful resolution of the “Taiwan issue” is a stated Chinese goal. (4) The alternatives – U.S. withdrawal – would not be attractive, as they most likely involve Japanese remilitarization. (5) China itself benefits from the public good – peace and stability – provided as a result of U.S.-Japanese cooperation. This stable external environment is conducive to China’s economic modernization and political transformation.

If these basic premises still hold, it is hard to see how Okinawa's future can be decoupled from the overall security picture of East Asia. Some have suggested a demilitarized Okinawa. Yet that will require a redeployment of U.S. troops and reacquisition of bases and facilities (most likely in Guam or the Philippines – both much farther than the two major regional contingencies that Okinawa are close to, that is, the Korean Peninsula and the Taiwan Strait).

However, this does not mean that nothing more can be done to reduce American footprints on the island. As has been pointed out earlier, given the most probable scenarios of future contingencies, including the Taiwan Strait, the marines can be substantially reduced. First, the main challenges require a mobile, fast-response type of operations. Second, the marines have been involved in many high-profile crimes, especially sexual assault and rape – the 1995 rape of a twelve-year-old girl was only "the tip of the iceberg." Third, the Futenma Marine Air Station should be relocated or have its functions absorbed by another comparable facility (e.g., Kadena) and more effort should be made to overcome inter-service turf war. All these measures will result in a reduction of those troops that are unlikely to be used in a future contingency in the region and greater public relations for the U.S. military, while not substantively affecting America's war-making capabilities in the region.

For the foreseeable future, U.S.-Japan alliance will continue to be the bedrock of peace and stability in the region and Okinawa will continue serving as the linchpin of America's military strategy in East Asia-Pacific. During the Cold War, defense was mainly on Japanese soil from a possible Soviet attack. In the first decade of the 21st century, the alliance
will take on more regional issues – toward the objective of “bilateral internationalism.”

David Asher makes a powerful argument for modeling the U.S.-Japan alliance after the U.S.-U.K. alliance in order to make Japan “the Great Britain of the Far East.” To achieve this goal:

- Japan should no longer hide behind its “Peace Constitution” and should recognize its right to collective self-defense.

- Japan should accept that the alliance has a global as well as regional dimension: Article 6 of the U.S.-Japan Mutual Security Treaty (“Far East”) should be prioritized.

- The U.S. and Japan should attempt to gradually integrate roles, missions, and eventually even forces.

- Japan should join a network of pacific allies.

- The alliance must be supported by a commitment to technological cooperation and system interoperability.

Whether this goal can be achieved remains an open question. Nevertheless, it is clear that in East Asia-Pacific, Japan is the best

---


74 See Asher, “Could Japan” and Armitage et al., “The United States and Japan.” For a scorecard on how the Armitage-Nye Report’s recommendations have been implemented, see Hwang, “A New Security Agenda,”: 8-10.
candidate for being the “Great Britain of the Far East,” and that, if successful, the reward can be huge.

As to Okinawa, in the short run, its importance as the staging ground for various regional threats, including the China-Taiwan contingency, is likely to rise. Its long-term future is enmeshed with the region as a whole: If peace and commerce prevails in the region, then regionalization and globalization will also benefit Okinawa, and render the island’s status of as a “cold war colony” obsolete. If, however, mutual suspicion and hostilities become the major trends of the region, then Okinawa will play a key role in determining the outcome of such conflicts, because it is where great powers intersect. Okinawa’s gratification will be temporarily belated but ultimately more rewarding.

As to Taiwan, the redefined U.S.-Japanese alliance, as exemplified by the Revised Guidelines for Defense Cooperation and the Joint Statement of the SCC, indicates greater commitment and coordination and more military options for defending Taiwan. But as the unprecedented coordinated diplomatic warnings by the U.S. and Japan issued to Taiwan’s Chen Shui-bian Administration prior to the 20 March 2004 presidential elections and referenda votes demonstrates, the ancillary aspect of the redefined alliance is preventive diplomacy. Precisely when the U.S. and Japan feel the need to upgrade their alliance in light of more grave security challenges (e.g., a nuclear-armed North Korea, a rising China that should decide to become a revisionist power, and terrorism), they seek to prevent war. This means that the U.S., which is presently preoccupied with war in Iraq and against terrorism, will enlist its alliance with Japan as one additional tool to maintain the delicate dual deterrence
The U.S.-Japanese Alliance Redefined: Implications for Security in the Taiwan Strait

in the Taiwan Strait.

Table 1: Japan’s Military Expenditure, 1985-99

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Current Dollars</th>
<th>Constant 1995 Dollars</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1985</td>
<td>27,400</td>
<td>37,550</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1986</td>
<td>29,480</td>
<td>39,340</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1987</td>
<td>31,970</td>
<td>41,380</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1988</td>
<td>34,740</td>
<td>43,370</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1989</td>
<td>37,640</td>
<td>45,110</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>40,740</td>
<td>46,820</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1991</td>
<td>43,820</td>
<td>48,430</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1992</td>
<td>46,030</td>
<td>49,510</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993</td>
<td>47,760</td>
<td>50,070</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>49,300</td>
<td>50,540</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>50,240</td>
<td>50,240</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>51,092</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>51,319</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>51,285</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>51,184</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2: Defense Expenditures of the U.S. and Asian Countries

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Defense Expenditure ($ million)</th>
<th>Defense Expenditure (% of GDP)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>299,300</td>
<td>273,600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>225,380</td>
<td>82,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>28,730</td>
<td>50,200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>11,300</td>
<td>33,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Korea</td>
<td>10,620</td>
<td>14,200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>10,100</td>
<td>10,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taiwan</td>
<td>8,690</td>
<td>13,400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>7,270</td>
<td>8,400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Korea</td>
<td>5,230</td>
<td>5,200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>2,910</td>
<td>3,600</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3: Japanese Defense Force

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Total Troops: 236,600 (Reserves 46,000)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ground SDF:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• 13 divisions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• 950 armored vehicles</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• 463 helicopters</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• 800 field artillery pieces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maritime SDF:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• 16 submarines</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• 58 surface combatants</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• 35 minesweepers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• 6 landing craft</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• 110 aircraft</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• 99 helicopters</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air SDF:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• 368 fighters</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• 42 transports</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• 182 others</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Navy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(# Subs plus principal surface combatants)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(# Combat aircraft)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Force (# combat aircraft)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Army (# soliders)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4: Geographical Distribution of Active U.S. Military Personnel Strengths

(as of 30 September 2000)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Regional Area / Country</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Army</th>
<th>Navy</th>
<th>Marine Corps</th>
<th>Air Force</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>United States and Territories</td>
<td>1,126,521</td>
<td>378,571</td>
<td>312,756</td>
<td>143,934</td>
<td>291,260</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Europe</td>
<td>117,411</td>
<td>70,251</td>
<td>10,843</td>
<td>3,441</td>
<td>32,876</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Former Soviet Union</td>
<td>160</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East Asia and Pacific</td>
<td>101,447</td>
<td>29,368</td>
<td>29,389</td>
<td>20,660</td>
<td>22,030</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>40,159</td>
<td>1,787</td>
<td>5,496</td>
<td>19,682</td>
<td>13,194</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Republic of Korea</td>
<td>36,565</td>
<td>27,481</td>
<td>318</td>
<td>97</td>
<td>8,669</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Afloat</td>
<td>23,352</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>23,307</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thailand</td>
<td>526</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>453</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Singapore</td>
<td>411</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>278</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>175</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Africa, Near East and South Asia</td>
<td>29,384</td>
<td>3,477</td>
<td>16,556</td>
<td>398</td>
<td>8,953</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sub-Saharan Africa</td>
<td>224</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>160</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Western Hemisphere</td>
<td>5,416</td>
<td>427</td>
<td>3,641</td>
<td>1,003</td>
<td>345</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total -- Foreign Countries</td>
<td>257,817</td>
<td>103,599</td>
<td>60,437</td>
<td>29,387</td>
<td>64,394</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total -- Worldwide</td>
<td>1,384,338</td>
<td>482,170</td>
<td>373,193</td>
<td>173,321</td>
<td>355,654</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Percentage figures in brackets [ ] are region's percentage of total U.S. armed forces stationed overseas.

http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/almanac/almanac/people/serve.html
[Accessed 2 March 2002].
Figure 1: Bases within 500 nm of Taiwan
Source: Khalizad, The United States and Asia, p. 68
Figure 2: Airports in the Southern Ryukyus

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Airport</th>
<th>Runway Dimensions (ft)</th>
<th>Distance from (nm)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Length</td>
<td>Width</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yanaguni</td>
<td>4921</td>
<td>148</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ishigaki</td>
<td>4921</td>
<td>148</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tarama</td>
<td>2635</td>
<td>82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shimojishima</td>
<td>9843</td>
<td>197</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Miyakojima</td>
<td>6562</td>
<td>148</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Khalizad, *The United States and Asia*, p. 74

Figure 3: Distance from Guam to Southeast Asia

Source: Khalizad, *The United States and Asia*, p. 76