Title

Perception, empiricism, and pragmatist realism

Document Type

Article

Publication Date

1-1-2011

Abstract

This article compares Peirce's pragmatist approach to the problem of perceptual experience as a fallible foundation of knowledge to a sophisticated empiricist position. While empiricism can accommodate the idea of perception as fallible, theoretically laden, and containing conjectural elements, the cardinal difference between pragmatism and empiricism consists in the pragmatist insistence on the intrinsic intelligibility of experience, which also serves as the ultimate source of all forms of intelligibility. Empiricism, on the other hand, retains a penchant for fitting experiences into abstract conceptual schemes. Editions Rodopi © 2011.

Publication Name

Contemporary Pragmatism

Volume Number

8

First Page

191

Last Page

210

Issue Number

1

DOI

10.1163/18758185-90000190

This document is currently not available here.

Share

COinS