Title

Adjusting for the correspondence bias: Effects of causal uncertainty, cognitive busyness, and causal strength of situational information

Document Type

Article

Publication Date

1-1-2006

Abstract

This research examined the conditions under which people who have more chronic doubt about their ability to make sense of social behavior (i.e., are causally uncertain; Weary & Edwards, 1994, 1996) are more likely to adjust their dispositional inferences for a target's behaviors. Using a cognitive busyness manipulation within the attitude attribution paradigm, we found in Study 1 that higher causal uncertainty predicted increased correction of dispositional inferences, but only when participants had sufficient attentional resources to devote to the task. In Study 2, we found that higher-causal uncertainty predicted greater inferential correction, but only when the additional information provided a more compelling alternative explanation for the observed behavior. Results of this research are discussed in terms of their relevance to the Causal Uncertainty (Weary & Edwards, 1994) and dispositional inference models. © 2005 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

Publication Name

Journal of Experimental Social Psychology

Volume Number

42

First Page

87

Last Page

94

Issue Number

1

DOI

10.1016/j.jesp.2005.01.003

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